| January 28, 2005 |
| Michael E Alpert, Chairman |
| Little Hoover Commission |
| 925 L Street, Suite 805 |
| Sacramento, CA 95814 |
| Re: Governors Reorganization Plan 1: Reforming Californias Boards and Commissions. |
| Oppose elimination of Acupuncture Board |
| Dear Mr. Alpert and Commissioners: |
| Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the Governors Reorganization Plan 1: Reforming |
| Californias Boards and Commissions. We feel that the Governors plan makes little sense in its |
| recommendation to eliminate the Acupuncture Board and other health care boards when |
| compared to the California Performance Review Report, which recommends retaining the |
| licensing boards for the health care professionals. While the Governors Plan cites the |
| methodology, criteria, and recommendations of the California Performance Review numerous |
| times, it draws significantly different conclusions and recommendations, without explanation or |
| rationale for the those differences. |
| The current form and structure of the Acupuncture Board is rational, well-conceived, and would |
| be smoothly functioning if it were not for the delays in the Governor appointments to the Board. |
| The Acupuncture Board serves the meaningful public purpose of protecting the health of |
| California consumers and of regulating a unique profession. Acupuncturists diagnose illness, |
| develop treatment plans, and perform traditional Asian healing procedures, such as acupuncture, |
| herbal medicine, and other therapies on those patients. Prior to licensure of acupuncturists, the |
| public was exposed to potentially incompetent and dangerous practices by individuals with |
| uncertain skills and credentials. The Acupuncture Board serves the function of setting and |
| maintaining standards of education, examination, and practice of a traditional branch of medicine, |
| so that the public can rest assured that those individuals licensed by the Acupuncture Board are |
| qualified to perform independent health care services, and can recognize conditions that |
| necessitate referral to qualified specialists from other branches of medicine. Without regulation by |
| an accessible and accountable agency, such as the Acupuncture Board, the publics health would |
| be put at increased risk. |
| In regards to accessibility and accountability, the Acupuncture Board holds regular public |
| meetings, efficiently schedules required regulatory public hearings to coincide with it board |
| meetings, takes recommendations and comments from the public patiently and seriously, and |
| forms task forces and workgroups when needed. The public can contact the Board by phone, fax, |
| or email. The Boards website contains valuable information for the public and for licensees, |
| including lists of licensees with Board actions against them. The Legislature thoroughly reviews |
| the Acupuncture Board every three or four years through the sunset review process. The |
| Administration thoroughly reviews the Acupuncture Boards regulatory proposals and annual |
| budget. The Governor, Senate, and Assembly all make direct appointments to the Acupuncture |
| Board. In other words, the Acupuncture Board is both highly accessible and highly accountable. |
| Unfortunately, the Governors Plan to move the Acupuncture Board into a departmental bureau |
| would make it less accessible, less accountable, and potentially less user friendly as it loses touch |
| with the public and the profession it regulates. We strongly recommend opposing the Governors |
| proposal to eliminate the Acupuncture Board. |
| The Little Hoover Commission staff has asked us to answer very specific questions regarding the |
| Acupuncture Board: |
| What considerations resulted in the current organizational design? |
| 1. The licensing of a unique independent primary health care profession. |
| 2. 100% of revenue are derived from the regulated profession licensing and examination fees. |
| 3. Protecting pubic safety and promoting public welfare through enforcement of education, |
| examination, and practice standards are major responsibilities. |
| 4. Various laws require legislative oversight, administrative oversight, direct public access, public |
| hearings and public notices, and website access. |
| 5. Years of organizing and re-organizing the functions of the Acupuncture Board. |
| Background: |
| The Acupuncture Board, currently an independent board within the Department of Consumer |
| Affairs, is tasked with regulating an independently licensed primary health care profession, and |
| was originally legislated as the Acupuncture Advisory Committee to the Medical Board in 1975. |
| The Medical Board provided guidance, oversight, administrative support, and medical expertise to |
| the Committee for years. The Committee had a set-back in the late 1980s, as a corrupt board |
| member was found to have criminally abused his licensing examination oversight authority. The |
| finding that he had profited from the sale of exams resulted in a legislative requirement that the |
| Committee contract with an independent party to prepare and administer the licensing |
| examination. The California Acupuncture Licensing Examination has become a model of integrity, |
| credibility, and reliability since that time. |
| Gradually, the Committee acted more independently as acupuncturists gained broader acceptance |
| as a unique and credible health care profession. The Committee was given full autonomy from the |
| Medical Board as a result of the legislative sunset review process in 1997-1998. The legislative |
| sunset review process also resulted in a reduction of the number of board members, from eleven |
| to nine, and to a majority of non-licensee members. |
| The Acupuncture Board has had various subcommittees over the years, and has efficiently |
| streamlined them into four standing subcommittees: Executive, Enforcement, Education, and |
| Examination. Education and examination of license applicants is commonly accepted as the best |
| method to assure public safety and professional competency. When those measures fail, and |
| particular licensees are found to endanger the public, enforcement becomes necessary. Thus, the |
| three specialty subcommittees are a direct result of the primary functions of the Board. Eight staff |
| members are similarly organized and supervised by an Executive Officer. Form followed function. |
| How have those considerations changed? |
| 1. Scope of practice, educational standards, examinations, public use of licensed services, and |
| enforcement cases have all expanded since licensing of acupuncturists was first legislated, |
| necessitating re-evaluating all standards on a regular basis. |
| 2. The Board has issued over 10,000 licenses since 1976, with increasing numbers each year, |
| necessitating thorough and efficient processing of licensee applications. |
| 3. The public expectation for the delivery of high quality health care services has gradually risen in |
| the three decades since acupuncturist legislation first passed, necessitating that the Board reevaluate |
| and upgrade standards on a regular basis. |
| 4. Numerous instances of dangerous and contaminated herbal products have surfaced over the |
| past decade, necessitating further assurance that licensees are well trained and knowledgeable in |
| herbal medicine. |
| 5. Contradictory arguments have been made by stakeholders to significantly improve educational |
| and examination standards in order to improve quality of services, and by other stakeholders to |
| lower educational and examination standards in order to increase diversity and variation in |
| licensees practices. This has necessitated that the Board hold numerous hearings on the subject in |
| order to separate political agendas from evidence-based recommendations. |
| While the three major board functions - education, examination, and enforcement of practice |
| standards - have periodically experienced challenges, the Acupuncture Board has built upon those |
| experiences to develop a smoothly functioning organization. As issues have arisen, the Board has |
| convened numerous task forces, workgroups, and subcommittees to address those issues. Pubic |
| hearings on regulatory changes and other matters are efficiently held in conjunction with regularly |
| scheduled board meetings. |
| It has been beneficial to the Acupuncture Board that the Executive Officer position has been |
| stable for eight years, and that one board member has served continuously for a similar period of |
| time. Many boards experience a loss of institutional memory with frequent staff and board |
| member turnover. Board members, essentially volunteering for non-permanent public service |
| positions, take a long time to learn and understand the intricacies of laws and regulations, meeting |
| protocol, and licensee oversight. The greatest difficulties faced by the Acupuncture Board in |
| recent years has resulted from the two recent Governors failure to fill empty board seats in a |
| timely manner, resulting in delays in important board actions and the timely implementation of |
| legislative and regulatory changes. The current Governor additionally ordered the Acupuncture |
| Board to delay compliance with new laws last year by prohibiting the Board from adopting new |
| regulations by the date required by statute. |
| What are the strengths and weaknesses of the current structure? |
| Strengths of the current board structure: |
| 1. Experienced and Efficient Staff - Acupuncture Board has competent and experienced staff |
| 2. Functional Organization - the Board is functionally organized and efficient, and holds annual |
| strategic planning sessions |
| 3. Public Notices and Regular Meetings - The Acupuncture Board holds regular pubic Board |
| meetings that are required to be scheduled and noticed with agendas. Meeting schedules, agendas, |
| and minutes are posted on the Board's website, and mailed to interested persons and |
| organizations. Regulatory changes require public hearings which are also noticed in advance for |
| public comment. The Board has been responsive to public comment, criticism, and |
| recommendations, and has organized numerous task forces and workshops. |
| 4. Accountability to Legislative Oversight - The Acupuncture Board is periodically reviewed in |
| open public hearings by the Joint Legislative Sunset Review Committee, which holds the |
| Acupuncture Board accountable to its constituency. Additionally, the Senate and Assembly have |
| appoint one board member each. |
| 5. Accountability to Administrative Oversight - the Board's actions and budget are held |
| accountable to, and regularly scrutinized by, the Department, Agency, and Governor. |
| 6. Accessibility to the Public - the Acupuncture Board's website is very useful, with easy access |
| to license verification, complaint forms, and other useful public information. Members of the |
| public have ready access to knowledgeable and informative staff via phone. Members of the public |
| can submit comments, complaints, and testimony via mail, fax, email, and phone. |
| Weaknesses of the current board structure: |
| 1. Understaffing - Enforcement is understaffed due to Governors Davis' and Schwartzenegger's |
| imposition of hiring freezes. The growing number of regulated licensees has resulted in increased |
| revenues and a gradually growing number of enforcement cases. |
| 2. Budgetary Micromanagement - The Acupuncture Board's budget is micromanaged by |
| Department/Agency/Governor, and budget freezes have limited the hiring of new staff, restricted |
| the locations of public meeting, and limited public access. Traveling restrictions prohibited staff |
| from traveling and attending important meetings with regulators from other states. The Board's |
| revenues are independent of the State's General Fund, as revenue is derived entirely from licensing |
| fees. The Governor ordered the taking of reserve funds from the Acupuncture Board in 2004. |
| This was done without authorization of the Board, and without public discussion or consideration |
| for alternative uses of the money, such as the recommended hiring of additional enforcement staff, |
| or refunding the unused fees to licensees. |
| 3. Lack of a Quorum - The new definition of a quorum legislated in 2002, combined with a |
| dependence upon Governor for board appointments has resulted in the Board being unable to |
| form a quorum, hold meetings, or participate in a formal decision-making process on matters of |
| importance, including taking action on some enforcement cases. |
| What are the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed structure? |
| Strengths of the Governors proposed structure: |
| None have been identified. |
| Weaknesses of the Governors proposed structure: |
| 1. Reduced Public Accessibility - Bureaus do not have regularly scheduled public meetings. |
| There are no meeting minutes to inform the public about their decision-making process. The |
| public must demand that bureaus hold hearings on regulatory change. There is little accountability |
| or incentive to respond to public input in a meaningful way. Without public notice, participation, |
| and information, bureaus can become isolated and out of touch with those they serve to protect |
| and regulate. |
| 2. Reduced Legislative Oversight - The Legislature would not have the opportunity to appoint |
| bureau members. |
| 3. No Projected Benefits or Justified Rationale - The Governors Plan, unlike the California |
| Performance Review Report, contains no estimates of savings, increased efficiency, or |
| improvements in public protection. The reduced public access and accountability under the |
| Governors Plan seems to conflict with the changes recommended in the Governors Plan. A |
| desire to blow up [government] boxes hardly seems to justify shuffling board boxes to bureau |
| boxes. |
| The California Performance Review |
| The California Performance Review utilized over two hundred state employees to evaluate 339 |
| boards and commissions, to recommend eliminating 117, and to retain 222 of them. The |
| Acupuncture Board was one of those recommended for continuance, along with most other |
| health care licensing boards, and to be placed under the administration of the Center for Quality |
| Assurance, Health and Human Services Department. (Exhibit 3, Form Follows Function, |
| California Performance Review, p.13). We concur with the CPR recommendations on this |
| matter, and disagree with the Governor's proposal to eliminate the Acupuncture Board and other |
| health care professional licensing boards. (Form Follows Function, California Performance |
| Review, pp 123-124,147,169). |
| The Governors Plan |
| The Governors Plan argues that accessibility and accountability are major criteria by which to |
| judge boards and commissions, which we agree with. The Governor suggests that, while boards |
| and commissions are legally bound to hold open public meetings, it may be better not to require |
| any public meetings, but to be satisfied with his recommendation that bureaus under his control |
| consider holding public workshops. The Acupuncture Board has held numerous public workshops |
| and task forces over the years per existing policy, so this is not a change. The Governor suggests |
| that he should be held accountable to the voting public for any failures of his administrative |
| bureaus, but not the bureaus themselves. (Governors Reorganization Plan 1: Reforming |
| Californias Boards and Commissions, p. 8). This seems to be a reduction in accountability, not |
| an increase. |
| When arguing for the elimination of independent health care licensing boards, the Governor |
| suggests that only administrative law judges are qualified to consider complaints against licensees, |
| and that boards are likely to have conflicts of interest. (Governors Reorganization Plan 1: |
| Reforming Californias Boards and Commissions, p. 12). We believe that it is not possible for a |
| single panel of administrative judges to be experts in the intricacies and standards of practices for |
| accountants, physicians, engineers, contractors, acupuncturists, and other professions, and that |
| allowing a panel of judges to weed through hundreds of consumer / patient complaints to find a |
| few legitimate complaints does not seem efficient at all. We would like to see this |
| recommendation clarified and publicly debated before being implemented. |
| Should the Commission have any further questions, please contact us. We look forward to your |
| report and recommendations on the Governors Plan. |
| Sincerely, |
| Brian C. Fennen, L.Ac, QME, OBT, Executive Director |