AB 226 requires sunset review of board to include consideration of whether a board can be replaced by Executive Officer.


Requires the Joint Committee on Boards, Commissions, and Consumer Protection (Committee) to consider whether the functions of a board or commission under their jurisdiction would be accomplished more effectively if the board or commission was replaced by a single executive officer.

Existing law contains numerous factors for the  Committee to evaluate in its analysis of various boards and  commissions. These factors can generally be described as  ranging from broad consideration of the need and value of a  regulatory program, to consideration of specific issues such as  consideration of administrative issues. This bill would add a  specific requirement to consider whether the regulatory program  currently performed under the organization structure of a board  or commission would be better served as an individual entity  overseen by a single executive officer.

The Consulting Engineers and Land Surveyors of California  (CELSOC) opposes this bill because "CELSOC has yet to be  persuaded that the existing review by the Joint Committee of the  various boards has resulted in tangible improvements. More  often, our experience has been that this review becomes a  vehicle for changes to licensure law that has nothing to do with  operations of the board."

473.4.  (a) The Joint Committee on Boards, Commissions, and Consumer
Protection shall evaluate and determine whether a board or
regulatory program has demonstrated a public need for the continued
existence of the board or regulatory program and for the degree of
regulation the board or regulatory program implements based on the
following factors and minimum standards of performance:
  (1) Whether regulation by the board is necessary to protect the
public health, safety, and welfare.
  (2) Whether the basis or facts that necessitated the initial
licensing or regulation of a practice or profession have changed.
  (3) Whether other conditions have arisen that would warrant
increased, decreased, or the same degree of regulation.
  (4) If regulation of the profession or practice is necessary,
whether existing statutes and regulations establish the least
restrictive form of regulation consistent with the public interest,
considering other available regulatory mechanisms, and whether the
board rules enhance the public interest and are within the scope of
legislative intent.
  (5) Whether the board operates and enforces its regulatory
responsibilities in the public interest and whether its regulatory
mission is impeded or enhanced by existing statutes, regulations,
policies, practices, or any other circumstances, including budgetary,
resource, and personnel matters.
  (6) Whether an analysis of board operations indicates that the
board performs its statutory duties efficiently and effectively.
  (7) Whether the composition of the board adequately represents the
public interest and whether the board encourages public
participation in its decisions rather than participation only by the
industry and individuals it regulates.
  (8) Whether the board and its laws or regulations stimulate or
restrict competition, and the extent of the economic impact the board'
s regulatory practices have on the state's business and technological
growth.
  (9) Whether complaint, investigation, powers to intervene, and
disciplinary procedures adequately protect the public and whether
final dispositions of complaints, investigations, restraining orders,
and disciplinary actions are in the public interest; or if it is,
instead, self-serving to the profession, industry or individuals
being regulated by the board.
  (10) Whether the scope of practice of the regulated profession or
occupation contributes to the highest utilization of personnel and
whether entry requirements encourage affirmative action.
  (11) Whether administrative and statutory changes are necessary to
improve board operations to enhance the public interest.
  (12) Whether the functions of the board would be accomplished more
effectively if the board was replaced by a single executive officer.
  (b) The Joint Committee on Boards, Commissions, and Consumer
Protection shall consider alternatives to placing responsibilities
and jurisdiction of the board under the Department of Consumer
Affairs.
  (c) Nothing in this section precludes any board from submitting
other appropriate information to the  Joint Committee on Boards,
Commissions, and Consumer Protection.